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1. Introduction 
 
Anonymity is one of the most important qualities of blockchain technology. For example, one 
can simply create a bitcoin address to send and receive funds without providing KYC to any 
authority. In general, the real identity behind cryptocurrency addresses is not known, 
however, some addresses can be clustered according to their ownership by analyzing 
behavioral patterns, allowing those with known attribution to be assigned labels. These 
labels may be further used for legal and compliance purposes to assist in law enforcement 
investigations. 
 
In this document, we discuss our methodology behind assigning attribution labels to 
cryptocurrency addresses. According to CoinMarketCap , as of October 2019, there are 1
more than three thousands cryptocurrencies in existence. Generally, we separate 
cryptocurrencies into two groups, each using a different method to assign address labels. 
The first group includes cryptocurrencies with an Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO), such 
as Bitcoin and Litecoin. Common spending and one-time change addresses are commonly 
used methods to cluster addresses. The second group focuses on account-based 
cryptocurrencies, such as Ethereum (including ERC20 tokens) and EOS, and we identify 
exchange addresses through analyzing funding patterns. Our initial address labels come 
primarily from two data sources: publicly available crowdsourcing websites such as the 
Bitcoin Abuse Database  and Etherscan ; as well as data annotated by Binance customers. 2 3
2. Related Works 
 
Since the birth of Bitcoin, both anonymization and de-anonymization techniques have been 
studied within the crypto sphere. One such example is the use of common spending and 
one-time change addresses [2][3] to cluster addresses for UTXO-based cryptocurrencies, 
such as Bitcoin. 
 
For account-based cryptocurrencies, like Ethereum, addresses are typically reused and do 
not change as frequently as UTXO-based cryptocurrencies. Although many address labels 
are published through official and unofficial channels (e.g. Etherscan for Ethereum and 
Bithomp for XRP), the vast majority of accounts still lack attribution. However, by using 
1 ​CoinMarketCap ​https://coinmarketcap.com/  
2 Bitcoin Abuse Database ​https://www.bitcoinabuse.com/  
3 Etherscan ​https://etherscan.io/  
 available labels as seeds, we may expand address labels to include deposit addresses 
belonging to cryptocurrency exchanges, dependent on their wallet architecture [5]. 
 
3. Address Clustering 
 
a. UTXO-based Cryptocurrencies 
 
i. Common Spending 
 
Common spending is one of the most commonly used methods for clustering Bitcoin 
addresses. For example, in Figure 1, the three input addresses for the transaction can be 
attributed to the same owner. This is because, in order to initiate the transaction, the sender 
must know the private keys for all input addresses at the same time. 
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of a Bitcoin Transaction 
 
We can create clusters by first building a graph with only the input addresses and 
transactions themselves (Figure 2), which then allows us to identify new relationships within 
the graph. Each linked component can be treated as a part of the group. 
 
  
Figure 2: Clustering via Transaction Graph 
 
Common spending assumes that each Bitcoin address is controlled by a single entity in the 
real world. Although not necessarily true for multi-signature addresses, the multi-sig 
technique does not change the nature of address clustering, and there remains an implied 
association between the entities. 
 
ii. One-time Change​ ​Inference 
 
The change resulting from a Bitcoin transaction is returned to the sender using a new 
address located on the output side. Therefore, change address analysis offers another way 
to expand upon clusters. However, as change addresses are not explicitly marked in a 
Bitcoin transaction, and they cannot always be inferred correctly, we must develop a number 
of patterns to minimize false-positives. 
 
An address has a high possibility of being a change address if it fits the following patterns: 
 
● there is more than one input address in the transaction; 
● one output address is new, but the remainder have been used; 
● the transfer amount of the new output address extends greater than 4 digits following 
the decimal; 
● the input and output share no common addresses; 
 
  
Figure 3: One-time Change Patterns 
 
b. Account-based Cryptocurrencies 
 
Unlike UTXO-based cryptocurrencies, change is not needed as senders may always send 
exact quantities of assets to recipients. Most cryptocurrency exchanges generate dedicated 
blockchain addresses for customers to process deposits. Assets received in the dedicated 
address will later be automatically transferred to a hot wallet. As exchange hot wallets are 
usually public and labeled through crowdsourcing, we can infer customer addresses using 
this gathering pattern.  
 
i. Fund Gathering Patterns 
 
Fund gathering patterns are used to cluster addresses that are created by cryptocurrency 
exchanges for customer deposits. If the addresses are deemed to belong to the same 
exchange, they are then grouped together. 
 
An example of fund gathering is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4: Ethereum is Swept to a Hot Wallet 
 
 A customer had 174.65893626 Ethereum and wanted to deposit it to their Binance account. 
To accomplish this, the customer simply transferred Ethereum to the deposit address for 
their account (provided and controlled by Binance). Some time after the transaction was 
confirmed, Binance automatically migrated the assets from that deposit address on-chain to 
the exchange’s hot wallet address. 
 
This gathering pattern is summarized in Figure 5, showing that we may group customer 
deposit addresses, as well as exchange hot and cold wallets, into a single cluster. 
 
 
Figure 5: Clustering Exchange Addresses using Gathering Patterns 
 
Hot and cold wallets for most exchanges can be obtained from public sources (e.g. 
Etherscan for Ethereum). Once a hot wallet is correctly labeled, we may then identify 
customer deposit addresses using the hot wallet. Usually, a customer’s deposit address 
transfers assets only to the hot wallet address, but may receive assets from any source. 
 
4. Experiments 
 
We evaluated our methodology using the public transactional data of Bitcoin and Ethereum 
networks before November 2019. Detailed results are as follows: 
 
a. Bitcoin 
 
Executing our technique on the Bitcoin network, we were able to assign labels for 115 million 
addresses. The top ten clusters with the most addresses are shown below: 
 
category name number of addresses 
 exchange c​oinbase.com 23,189,630 
merchant service gocoin.com 6,960,885 
p2p exchange localbitcoins.com 5,793,274 
merchant service coinpayments.net 5,080,340 
merchant service bitpay.com 4,343,764 
exchange binance.com 3,663,255 
hosted wallet xapo.com 2,171,501 
exchange coins.co.th 2,087,623 
exchange cubits.com 2,043,583 
exchange bittrex.com 1,604,589 
 
 
b. Ethereum 
 
Using our methodology, we were able to label more than 7 million addresses from a seed set 
of only 515 exchange addresses. The top ten exchanges with most customer deposit 
addresses are below: 
 
category peer_name number of addresses 
exchange binance.com 2,175,948 
exchange bittrex.com 804,789 
exchange kucoin.com 600,525 
exchange bitfinex.com 352,903 
exchange kraken.com 339,253 
exchange huobi.com 330,841 
exchange poloniex.com 272,129 
exchange okex.com 265,791 
exchange upbit.com 234,105 
exchange hitbtc.com 224,654 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
● We demonstrated address clustering techniques for both UTXO-based and 
account-based cryptocurrencies; 
 
● Our methodology was implemented and evaluated with the Bitcoin network and 
Ethereum network. In total, 115 million Bitcoin addresses and 7 million Ethereum 
addresses were assigned a label. 
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